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McKinley: Drug Quantities for Mandatory Minimums

THE IMPORTANCE OF DRUG QUANTITY IN FEDERAL
SENTENCING: HOW CIRCUIT COURTS SHOULD DETERMINE
THE MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCE FOR CONSPIRACY TO
DISTRIBUTE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES IN LIGHT OF UNITED
STATES V. STODDARD
Elizabeth McKinley

I. INTRODUCTION
Each day, nearly half of all individuals serving sentences in federal
penitentiaries are drug offenders.1 That equates to approximately 77,000
inmates.2 These staggering numbers continue to remain high as more
and more individuals are being charged, convicted, and sentenced for
federal drug crimes.3 A majority of the individuals serving sentences for
drug offenses received a mandatory minimum sentence.4 One of the
most prevalent mandatory minimum sentence statutes that drug
offenders are charged under is 21 U.S.C. § 846,5 otherwise known as the
attempt or conspiracy statute.6
Many federal circuits have disagreed on the proper approach for
determining the quantity of drugs used to establish the mandatory
minimum sentence for an individual convicted on the charge of
conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance. Multiple circuits have
held that the mandatory minimum for conspiracy to distribute should be
based on the amount of drugs attributable to the conspiracy as a whole.
However, other circuits have held that the amount of drugs attributable
or reasonably foreseeable to the defendant is the proper basis for the
1. FED.
BUREAU
OF
PRISONS,
BOP
Statistics:
Inmate
Offenses
https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_inmate_offenses.jsp (last updated Jan. 29, 2019).
2. Id.
3. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2011 Report to the Congress: Mandatory Minimum
Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System, Chapter Eight: Mandatory Minimum Penalties for
Drug Offenses at 152, https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-andreports/mandatory-minimum-penalties/20111031-rtc-pdf/Chapter_08.pdf (2011) (“In fiscal year 2010,
drug offenses were 28.0 percent of the reported cases [to the Commission], with 23,964 offenders
convicted of a drug offense.”); see also, BOP Statistics: Inmate Offenses, supra note 2.
4. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2017 Overview of Mandatory Minimum Penalties for Drug
Offenses
in
the
Federal
Criminal
Justice
System,
at
4
(Oct.
2017)
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/researchpublications/2017/20171025_Drug-Mand-Min.pdf [hereinafter U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2017
Overview] (“Among drug offenders in federal prison as of September 30, 2016, almost three-quarters
(72.3%) were convicted of an offense carrying a mandatory minimum penalty, and more than half
(50.4%) remained subject to that penalty at sentencing.”).
5. 21 U.S.C. § 846 (LexisNexis, Lexis Advance through PL 115-385, approved 12/21/18, with
a gap of PL 115-334).
6. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2017 Overview, supra note 5, at 15-16.
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mandatory minimum. The most recent court to uphold the use of this
individualized approach is the District of Columbia Circuit in United
States v. Stoddard.7 This Note asserts that every federal circuit court
should determine the mandatory minimum sentence for an individual
convicted of conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance based on the
amount attributable or reasonably foreseeable to the individual
defendant rather than the amount attributable to the conspiracy as a
whole. Part II of this Note provides a background of the federal drug
offenses and the federal conspiracy statute under the United States
Code. Further, Part II discusses the split among the Federal Circuits
regarding the appropriate method to determine the mandatory minimum
for an individual convicted of conspiracy to distribute a controlled
substance. Finally, Part II concludes by examining the circuits that have
recently questioned their use of the conspiracy-based approach.
Part III of this Note discusses why the individual based approach is
the proper method to determine an individual’s mandatory minimum
sentence for conspiracy to distribute. First, this section will discuss why
the legal rationale set forth by the D.C. Circuit in United States v.
Stoddard is the proper interpretation of Supreme Court and district court
precedent to determine whether the individualized or conspiracy-based
approach should be utilized. Second, Part III will examine various
policy reasons that support the individualized approach, including: (1)
instances of the Government’s support of the individualized approach
and (2) the data on the immense number of individuals serving prison
terms for drug offenses with lengthy mandatory minimum sentences.
This section ends by discussing the current shift in some circuits toward
the adoption of the individualized approach in determining the
mandatory minimum for conspiracy to distribute.
Finally, Part IV concludes that because precedential case law and
strong policy reasons support the use of the individualized approach, all
Circuits should adopt this method of determining the mandatory
minimum sentences for conspiracy to distribute drugs. Additionally, this
section calls on circuits that still utilize the conspiracy-based approach,
including the Sixth Circuit, to change the law and formally adopt the
individualized approach.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Conspiracy and the Drug Offenses
An individual can be charged under the United States Code with the
7. United States v. Stoddard, 892 F.3d 1203, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
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crime of attempt to commit an act or conspiracy. 8 Section 846 states that
“[a]ny person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined
in this subchapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those
prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of
the attempt or conspiracy.”9 When an individual is charged with
conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. § 841
proscribes the specific base drug offense and the subsequent penalties.10
21 U.S.C. § 841(a) states that “it shall be unlawful for any person
knowingly or intentionally – (1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense,
or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a
controlled substance.”11 To determine the penalties for a violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), courts must look to § 841(b) to determine the
corresponding penalty for the specific controlled substance at issue and
the weight of that substance.12 While this statute gives guidance to
courts on the maximum penalties for the specific types and weights of
drugs a defendant possesses, circuit courts are ideologically split on how
to determine the amount of drugs upon which to base the defendant’s
mandatory minimum sentence under § 841.
B. Calculating the mandatory minimum based on quantity of controlled
substance attributable to the conspiracy as a whole
Some circuits are of the opinion that to determine a defendant’s
mandatory minimum sentence for conspiracy to distribute a controlled
substance, courts should base the amount of drugs used for sentencing
purposes on the amount of drugs attributable to the conspiracy as a
whole.13 In United States v. Knight,14 the Seventh Circuit held that the
defendant’s sentence of life in prison for conspiracy and possession was
proper because the jury determined that each defendant participated in
the conspiracy and the type and amount of drugs attributable to the
conspiracy, while the judge “determined the drug quantity attributable to
that particular defendant and sentenced him accordingly.”15
In Knight, the two defendants, Knight and Williams, created a

8. 21 U.S.C. § 846.
9. Id.
10. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (LexisNexis, Lexis Advance through PL 115-385, approved 12/21/18, with
a gap of PL 115-334).
11. Id. § 841(a)(1).
12. Id. § 841(b).
13. E.g. United States v. Phillips, 349 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 2003), vacated on other grounds,
Barbour v. United States, 543 U.S. 1102 (2005); United States v. Knight, 342 F.3d 697 (7th Cir. 2003)
14. Knight, 342 F.3d 697 (7th Cir. 2003).
15. Id. at 712.
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conspiracy to traffic cocaine from California to Wisconsin. 16 Knight,
“the organizer and leader” of the drug conspiracy and Williams, “his
second in command,” recruited many individuals to act as “couriers and
dealers” who transported and distributed the drugs to other individuals.17
One courier was arrested and stated that she received her supply of
drugs from Knight and Williams.18 Thereafter, the two were arrested and
charged, in part, with both conspiracy to distribute and possession of a
controlled substance with the intent to distribute.19 During the trial, the
jury was instructed to “determine each defendant’s guilt on each count”
and then, “once guilt was established, whether the offense charged
involved five or more kilograms of cocaine.”20 The jury found Knight
and Williams guilty of conspiracy and, under the guidelines of the
statute, the defendants were both sentenced to life in prison, the
maximum punishment that either defendant was able to receive for the
charge of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances. 21
On appeal, Knight and Williams argued that the jury instructions
were “erroneous” due to the rationale set forth in the Supreme Court
case, Apprendi v. New Jersey,22 arguing that there is a requirement for
the jury make an individualized finding of fact of the amount and type
of drug for which each defendant is responsible instead of finding that
the amount of drug involved in the conspiracy exceeded the amount
prescribed by the statute.23 The Seventh Circuit, however, held that the
jury instruction was not erroneous as the jury determined not only that
the defendants’ were part of the conspiracy, but also that the prosecution
proved beyond a reasonable doubt a specific quantity of drugs
attributable to the entire conspiracy. 24 Additionally, the Seventh Circuit
found that the trial judge properly sentenced the defendant’s based on
the amount he determined was attributable to each individual defendant,
as the amount attributable to each defendant was the entire amount
attributable to the conspiracy as a whole.25
In Knight, the Seventh Circuit adopted the conspiracy-based approach
from the First Circuit’s previous reasoning in Dernman v. United

16. Id. at 701.
17. Id. at 701-702.
18. Knight, 342 F.3d at 703.
19. Id. Two other defendants, Newton and Durant, were also charged with conspiracy and tried
with Knight and Williams. Id. at 703-04.
20. Id. at 704.
21. Id.
22. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
23. Knight, 342 F.3d at 709.
24. Id. at 712.
25. Id.
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States,26 which stated that the jury must only make the determination of
whether an individual was involved in a conspiracy and any factors that
may increase the statutory maximum penalty, while “the judge may
lawfully determine the drug quantity attributable to that defendant and
sentence him accordingly” within that prescribed statutory maximum
determined by the jury’s findings.27 The Seventh Circuit agreed with the
Dernman rationale which posited that there is no requirement under the
holding of Apprendi that a jury must use the individualized approach in
“findings of drug type and quantity in drug-conspiracy cases.”28 The
Knight court did find, however, that there was “overwhelming
evidence” that each of the defendants played important roles in the
conspiracy and specifically possessed, or had knowledge that other
individuals in the conspiracy possessed, many kilograms of cocaine.29
Therefore, the court found that each defendant was responsible for “the
full weight of drugs involved [in the conspiracy].”30
C. Calculating the mandatory minimum based on quantity of controlled
substance that was “reasonably foreseeable” to each individual
defendant
On the contrary, many circuits have held that in determining the
mandatory minimum sentence for conspiracy to distribute a controlled
substance, a sentence should be based on the quantity of drugs that was
attributable or “reasonably foreseeable” to the individual defendant.31
The First Circuit recently held that the jury must be the finder of fact
who determines the quantities of controlled substance upon which the
mandatory minimum and statutory maximum are based.32 In United
States v. Pizarro, the defendant, Pizarro, was convicted on charges of
conspiracy to distribute various types of controlled substances33 and was
sentenced to life in prison.34 When determining the amount of controlled
substances attributable to Pizzaro, the district court judge determined
there was sufficient evidence to find that Pizarro was accountable for
more than the “five kilograms or more of cocaine or one kilogram or
26. Derman v. United States, 298 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2002).
27. Knight, 342 F.3d at 710 (citing Derman v. United States, 298 F.3d 34, 42-43 (1st Cir. 2002)).
28. Knight, 342 F.3d at 710.
29. Id. at 712.
30. Id.
31. E.g., United States v. Pizarro, 772 F.3d 284 (1st Cir. 2014); United States v. Rangel, 781
F.3d 736 (4th Cir. 2015); United States v. Haines, 803 F.3d 713 (5th Cir. 2015); United States v.
Banuelos, 322 F.3d 700 (9th Cir. 2003).
32. Pizarro, 772 F.3d at 293.
33. Id. at 287.
34. Id. at 288.
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more of a mixture or substance containing heroin”35 and thus should be
sentenced to the maximum of life. 36 Pizarro appealed his sentence37 and
argued that “the district court committed an Alleyne error by applying a
mandatory minimum sentence without the requisite drug quantity
findings by the jury.”38 On appeal, the First Circuit rationalized the
holding under Alleyne v. United States,39 finding that “the drug quantity
that triggers the mandatory minimum for a 21 U.S.C. § 846 conspiracy
must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” 40 The court further
specified that the “conspiracy-wide quantity . . . governs the statutory
maximum” while “the individualized quantity, i.e. the quantity that is
foreseeable to the defendant, … triggers the mandatory minimum.”41
Based on this rationale, the court held that that the jury did not make a
finding of fact on the quantity of drugs reasonably foreseeable to
Pizarro; therefore, the lower court erred in Pizarro’s sentencing.42
The Fifth Circuit also adopted the individual-based approach in
United States v. Haines.43 In Haines, the defendants, Haines, Porter, and
Iturres-Bonilla, were charged in part with “conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin.”44 The defendants
were convicted based on the jury finding that the entire conspiracy
“involved one kilogram or more of heroin.”45 The district court found
that this finding of fact by the jury “triggered the statutory minimum of
twenty years for Haines and Porter.”46 On appeal, two of the defendants,
Haines and Porter, challenged the district court’s use of the conspiracybased approach in determining the quantity of controlled substance for
sentencing rather than the jury making the finding of fact of the quantity
of controlled substance attributable to each individual defendant.47 On
appeal, the government agreed with the defendants that the district court
should have based the sentence on the individualized approach but
believed that the Fifth Circuit’s precedent supported the conspiracy-

35. Id. (“court found Pizarro accountable for more than 150 kilograms . . . .”).
36. Id.
37. Pizarro, 772 F.3d at 289-290.
38. Id. at 289-290 (stating that the appeal was on “the convictions for the aggravated offenses
with enhanced drug quantities under § 841(b)(1)(A),” Pizarro, 772 F.3d at 290). (emphasis added?)
39. Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013).
40. Pizarro, 772 F.3d at 292.
41. Id. at 292-93.
42. Id. at 293.
43. United States v. Haines, 803 F.3d 713 (5th Cir. 2015).
44. Id. at 719-20.
45. Id. at 720.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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wide approach.48
Finding for the defendants, the Haines court held that the defendants’
sentences should have been “based on the drug quantity attributable to
them as individuals” and thus vacated the defendants’ sentences as the
jury made no finding of fact with regard to the quantity attributable to
each individual defendant.49 The court rationalized this shift away from
Fifth Circuit precedent by determining that the Supreme Court opinions
in Apprendi and Alleyne require a finding by the jury of factors that
increase a defendant’s sentence.50 The court found that because “the
quantity of the controlled substance can ‘significantly increase the
maximum penalty[,]’” the quantity of heroin attributable to each
defendant was a fact that should have been determined by the jury. 51
D. United States v. Stoddard52
The most recent decision in which a circuit court shifted from using
the conspiracy-based approach to the individualized approach is the
District of Columbia Circuit’s decision in United States v. Stoddard.53 In
2012, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) was investigating the
heroin-trafficking activities of Jermaine Washington.54 The FBI
observed Washington’s activities by utilizing various methods of
surveillance, including drug-buys by a confidential informant, a wiretap,
surveillance, and recorded phone conversations.55 During this
surveillance, the FBI recorded phone conversations between
Washington and two individuals, Sidney Woodruff and Calvin Stoddard,
and observed Washington meeting with the two aforementioned
individuals.56 Further, the FBI obtained conversations between
Washington and Jerome Cobble.57 Subsequently, when the FBI
conducted a search of Washington’s residence, it found over 20 grams
of heroin, drug paraphernalia, and thousands of dollars in cash.58
Washington then pled guilty to multiple charges including conspiracy to
distribute a controlled substance and agreed to be a cooperating witness

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Haines, 803 F.3d at 738.
Id. at 739.
Id. at 738.
Id. at 738-39.
Stoddard, 892 F.3d 1203 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
Id.
Id. at 1208.
Id.
Id.
Stoddard, 892 F.3d at 1208.
Id. at 1208.
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for the government.59
A grand jury indicted Calvin Stoddard, Jerome Cobble, and Sidney
Woodruff with conspiracy to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846 in conjunction with additional
charges.60 During the trial, Washington testified against Stoddard and
recounted various conversations where he and Stoddard discussed
purchasing heroin as well as instances where Washington sold heroin to
Stoddard.61 After both the Government and the defense rested their
cases, the court denied the defendants’ motions for acquittal and
proceeded with the jury instructions.62 When contemplating the jury
instructions, the Government proposed that the jury determine the
amount of drugs the jury believed to be attributable to each specific
defendant.63 The district court, although cognizant of other circuits that
followed the individualized approach, determined that it was appropriate
to “use a verdict form without individualized drug quantity
determinations.”64
When issuing a verdict, “[t]he jury found Woodruff and Stoddard
guilty of the drug-conspiracy charge and found that the conspiracy, as a
whole, involved 100 grams or more of heroin.”65 The defendants then
moved for a new trial, arguing that the jury should have been instructed
to determine the amount of controlled substance attributable to each
individual defendant rather than finding the amount of controlled
substance attributable to the entire conspiracy.66 While the Government
opposed the defendants’ motion for a new trial, it agreed that the jury
should have been given the instruction to “find the amount attributable
to each defendant” and the defendants’ sentence should not have been
based on “the 100 grams the jury found attributable to the conspiracy as
a whole.”67 The district court ultimately rejected the defendants motion
for a new trial.68 During sentencing, Woodruff and Stoddard again
raised the issue that the amount of controlled substance utilized in
determining the mandatory minimum and statutory maximum for
sentencing should not be based on the quantity attributable to the entire
conspiracy.69 The Government agreed again in their sentencing
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1209.
Stoddard, 892 F.3d at 1210.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1210-11.
Stoddard, 892 F.3d at 1210-11.
Id.
Id. at 1211.
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memorandum with the defendants’ proposition.70
On appeal, both Woodruff and Stoddard again raised the issue that
their sentences were improperly calculated based on the amount of
controlled substance attributable to the conspiracy as a whole rather than
the amount a jury should find attributable to each of them individually.71
Upon review, the D.C. Circuit confirmed that the jury instructions
mandated that the jury find that the defendants’ had “entered a
conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance containing heroin” and
that the amount of that controlled substance in the conspiracy was
greater than 100 grams.72 The court further established that jury
instructions did not charge the jury with finding that “it was ‘reasonably
foreseeable’ to each defendant that 100 grams or more would be
distributed within the scope of the conspiracy.” 73 The D.C. Circuit held
that the “reasonably foreseeable” approach was the proper approach to
use when determining the mandatory minimum for conspiracy to
distribute a controlled substance and, thus, vacated the defendants’
sentences.74
In arriving to this position, the Stoddard court first reviewed their
own precedent in United States v. Law,75 which held that a violation of §
846 “encompasses all of the crimes reasonably foreseeable within that
conspiracy” and thus “a defendant convicted of conspiracy to deal
drugs, in violation of § 846, must be sentenced, under § 841(b), for the
quantity of drugs the jury attributes to him as a reasonably foreseeable
part of the conspiracy.”76 The Stoddard court found that this reasonably
foreseeable principle in Law was applicable in the determination of drug
quantity for sentencing.77 The court then looked to Supreme Court
precedent that supported the decision in Law and the utilization of the
individualized approach.78 The first Supreme Court case the Stoddard
court reviewed was Burrage v. United States,79 which held that a jury
must make the factual finding that a death resulted from a controlled
substance under § 841(b)(1) before a mandatory minimum sentence
could be imposed upon a defendant for that crime.80 The Burrage court
determined that because the death enhancement increased the mandatory
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id. at 1218.
Stoddard, 892 F.3d at 1219.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Law, 528 F.3d 888 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
Stoddard, 892 F.3d at 1221 (citing Law, 528 F.3d at 906).
Stoddard, 892 F.3d at 1221-1222.
Id.
Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014).
Stoddard, 892 F.3d at 1219 (citing Burrage, 571 U.S. at 210).
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minimum sentence of the controlled substance charge, it is necessary for
a jury to make a specific finding as to that fact.81 Similarly, the Stoddard
court held that this principle was applicable to the issue “of a
mandatory-minimum drug quantity” as the quantity of a controlled
substance is a fact that increases a sentence.82 Next, the court
rationalized the Burrage issue under the Supreme Court’s holding in
Alleyne v. United States.83 In support of its deviation from First Circuit
precedent, the court then noted that many circuits who continue to
follow the conspiracy-wide approach have begun to question whether
that approach is correct in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Alleyne.84 Finally, the Stoddard court stated that their individual based
approach was supported by instances of the Government urging other
circuits to reconsider the use of the conspiracy-wide approach and
because the Government’s “charging policy employs the individualized
approach.”85
E. Circuits that are re-examining their precedents
Recently, some circuit courts have begun to re-examine their use of a
conspiracy-based approach. In United States v. Ellis,86 the Tenth Circuit
found that the district court committed error under the holding of
Alleyne by sentencing the defendant “without the jury’s having found
his individually attributable amount of cocaine.”87 While the court
concluded that the district court erred in the sentencing of the defendant,
the court nevertheless based the sentence on the holding in the previous
circuit case of Untied States v. Stiger.88 The Ellis court understood
Stiger to hold that the jury’s finding of the amount of drugs attributable
to the conspiracy “sets the maximum sentence that each coconspirator
could be given” but the judge has the authority to determine the
minimum sentence for each defendant by making a decision as to the
amount of controlled substance attributable to each individual defendant
involved in the conspiracy.89 In Ellis, the Tenth Circuit, thus lessened

81. Id.
82. Id. Stoddard, 892 F.3d at 1219.
83. Id. at 1222; see Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 108 (2013) (holding that “[f]acts that
increase the mandatory minimum sentence are therefore elements that must be submitted to the jury and
found beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
84. Stoddard, 892 F.3d at 1220.
85. Id. at 1222.
86. United States v. Ellis, 868 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. 2017).
87. Id. at 1170.
88. Id. at 1178; United States v. Stiger, 413 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 2005).
89. Ellis, 868 F.3d at 1175 (quoting United States v. Stiger, 413 F.3d at 1192 (10th Cir. 2005)).
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the precedential value of the Stiger decision.90
The Sixth Circuit has also recently reviewed the conspiracy-wide
approach in its decisions in United States v. Gibson 91 and United States
v. Young.92 In 2008, the Sixth Circuit seemingly adopted the
conspiracy-wide approach in United States v. Robinson.93 In Robinson,
the jury was instructed to determine whether the defendant, Robinson,
“knowingly joined the conspiracy” and what “quantity [of drugs] [were]
involved in the conspiracy,” but not whether Robinson had knowledge
of the conspiracy wide quantity of the drugs. 94 Robinson was convicted
and sentenced to life.95 The Sixth Circuit upheld the jury instructions
and subsequent conviction by reasoning that the district court was
unable to determine the “amount or kind of drugs for which Robinson
was personally responsible” because there was no minimum or
maximum sentencing range for Robinson.96
This conspiracy-based approach taken in Robinson has recently been
revisited in both Young and Gibson. In United States v. Young, the
defendants Young, Duncan, Parnell, and Vance were indicted on
conspiracy to “distribute and possess with intent to distribute controlled
substances.”97 On appeal, Parnell argued that the district court erred in
sentencing by not allowing the jury to find the amount of controlled
substance attributable to him.98 The Sixth Circuit held that even though
the Sixth Circuit had issued contradictory opinions on how the
mandatory minimum should be determined, Parnell’s sentence would be
the same under either approach, thus refusing to clarify the contradictory
opinions.99 The court examined the facts under the individualized
approach and found that the life sentence of Parnell was appropriate
because “the quantity of cocaine and crack cocaine required for
conviction . . . were within the scope of the conspiracy of which Parnell
was a part and was reasonably attributable to Parnell.”100 The court
reasoned that because Parnell obtained his drugs from the “kingpin of
the conspiracy” and had knowledge that other members of the
conspiracy were manufacturing and possessing the narcotics, the amount

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Ellis, 868 F.3d at 1178.
United States v. Gibson, 874 F.3d 544 (6th Cir. 2017).
United States v. Young, 847 F.3d 328 (6th Cir. 2017).
United States v. Robinson, 547 F.3d 632 (6th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 637.
Id.
Id. at 640.
Young, 847 F.3d at 338.
Id. at 365.
Id. at 367.
Id.
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of the entire conspiracy was reasonably attributable to him.101
In the Sixth Circuit case Gibson, the defendant, Gibson, appealed his
sentence for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine arguing that in
his plea “he never admitted that it was reasonably foreseeable to him”
that the conspiracy involved the amount of drugs prescribed under the
statute.102 The district court followed the Robinson precedent that “the
relevant quantity determination is the quantity involved in the
conspiracy.”103 Subsequently, the Sixth Circuit reheard Gibson’s appeal
of his sentence en banc.104 However, the en banc court divided evenly
and upheld the district court’s sentence.105
III. DISCUSSION
In sentencing an individual defendant charged with, and convicted of,
conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance under 21 U.S.C. § 846,
federal courts should determine the mandatory minimum sentence based
upon the amount of controlled substance which is specifically
attributable to each individual defendant. In determining the amount
attributable to individual defendants, courts and juries must base this
finding on the amount of controlled substance that was either directly
attributable, or reasonably foreseeable, to each individual defendant. On
this issue, circuits are divided regarding whether to continue using a
conspiracy-based approach or adopt the defendant-advantageous,
individualized approach. Most recently, the District of Columbia Circuit
Court in United States v. Stoddard shifted from the previous position of
using the conspiracy-based approach to using an individualized
approach in determining the mandatory minimum for conspiracy to
distribute drugs. In Stoddard, the D.C. Circuit grounded their argument
on both legal precedents and persuasive reasoning. The rationale put
forth by Stoddard is the correct interpretation courts should determine
the issue of whether to use the individualized or conspiracy-wide
approach when determining the mandatory minimum for conspiracy to
distribute drugs.
This discussion section will first explore the rationale the D.C. Circuit
used in United States v. Stoddard by evaluating the court’s reliance on
Supreme Court and circuit court precedent when determining the
mandatory minimum sentence for conspiracy to distribute a controlled
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 367-68.
United States v. Gibson, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 21141 at *1 (6th Cir. 2016).
United States v. Gibson, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 21141 at *3.
United States v. Gibson, 874 F.3d 544 (6th Cir. 2017).
Id.
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substance. Second, this section will discuss various policy reasons
supporting the individualized approach, including various instances of
the Government’s support of the use of the individualized approach and
the immense number of individuals in federal prison serving sentences
for controlled substance crimes which carry lengthy mandatory
minimums. Finally, this discussion will look at how circuits are moving
toward adopting the individualized approach, including the various
shifts in the Sixth Circuit that demonstrate support for the use of the
individualized approach, as well as the potential for adopting that
approach in the near future.
A. The Stoddard court properly analyzed Supreme Court and circuit
precedent to affirm the use of the individualized approach.
A primary case the Stoddard court relied upon in their determination
to utilize the individualized approach was Alleyne v. United States. The
court properly relied on this precedent in finding for the individualized
approach for multiple reasons. First, the Supreme Court in Alleyne held
that when there is a fact that has the potential to increase the sentencing
range for a defendant, that fact should be considered as an element of
the crime.106 The Court reasoned that because these “aggravating facts”
cause a defendant to face a higher statutory penalty, a jury must find that
the prosecution proved these facts beyond a reasonable doubt before it
can cause a defendant to face a harsher penalty.107
The legal analysis set forth in Alleyne provides guidance to the circuit
courts on how to evaluate and decide whether to adopt the conspiracy or
individualized approach when determining mandatory minimum
sentences for conspiracy to distribute cases.108 The holding in Alleyne
clearly delineates that there are instances under various federal statutory
penalties where the jury must make a finding of fact before the court has
the ability to impose a lengthier sentence upon a defendant.109 As this
holding in Alleyne is broad, it is applicable to the elements of various
federal crimes. The rationale serves as a foundation from which courts
can determine what facts are, or are not, “aggravating facts” for an
individual defendant and, thus, determine the appropriate sentence to be
imposed.
The decision to find that circuits should follow the individualized
approach is additionally bolstered by the Supreme Court’s holding in

106.
107.
108.
109.

Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 115-116 (2013).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Burrage v. United States.110 When interpreting the holding of the
Burrage case, the Stoddard court properly analogized the death
enhancement for a conspiracy case to the type and quantity of drugs
attributable to a defendant in a conspiracy case.111 The statute that
describes the base-level offenses for the drug crimes distinguishes the
sentences for those offenses by both the type of drug and the quantity of
said drug. In Burrage, the Supreme Court found that the enhancement
for a death resulting from the distribution of drugs was a factor that a
jury had to consider when reaching a verdict. Because Burrage directly
advanced the principle that a jury must determine the factual finding of
the offense and enhancement before a court can impose the mandatory
minimum for that enhancement, the Stoddard court properly applied that
rationale to the mandatory minimum sentence for various drug
quantities.
While not expressly described as enhancements, the specific quantity
and type of controlled substance as prescribed under 21 U.S.C. § 841
alters the sentence a defendant may receive for possession or
distribution of a drug.112 When a jury or judge makes the factual finding
as to the amount and type of drug applicable to each defendant, this
factual finding increases the possible sentence which the defendant may
receive under § 841. In viewing this factual finding as an enhancement,
it is clear that the courts are then required to follow the principle put
forth in Burrage: the enhancement must be determined by a jury.
Therefore, this enhancement standard set forth in Burrage is directly
applicable to the imbedded enhancement of the sentence based on type
and quantity of controlled substances in the drug offense statute.
Finally, the Stoddard court looked to its own circuit’s decision in
Untied States v. Law113 to support its finding to utilize the
individualized approach.114 In Law, the D.C. Circuit held that when a
defendant is convicted of conspiracy to distribute, the sentence must be
based on the “quantity of drugs that the jury attributes to him as a
reasonably foreseeable part of the conspiracy.”115 While the Stoddard
court acknowledged that Law was distinguishable from Stoddard, as
they did not directly rule on the individualized issue in Law, the court
did find that the Law decision supports the finding of the individualized

110. Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014).
111. United States v. Stoddard, 892 F.3d 1203, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
112. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (LexisNexis, Lexis Advance through PL 115-385, approved 12/21/18, with
a gap of PL 115-334).
113. United States v. Law, 528 F.3d 888 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
114. Stoddard, 892 F.3d at 1221-1222.
115. Law, 528 F.3d at 906.
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approach in determining drug quantity for sentencing.116 The Stoddard
court correctly rationalized and interpreted the Law decision in adopting
the individualized approach. While the Law decision is not dispositive
on the issue of how mandatory minimums should be determined for
conspiracy to distribute, the fact that the court held that the jury must
determine the amount of controlled substance reasonably foreseeable to
the defendant as part of the conspiracy is indicative of the court desiring
to sentence a defendant for the limited quantity of controlled substance
of which he or she knew.
B. Policy reasons supporting the adoption of the individualized
approach
One persuasive policy argument supporting the position that the
federal courts should apply the individual based approach is that, in
multiple cases on this issue, the Government has asserted that the
individualized approach should be utilized.117 In the Stoddard opinion,
the D.C. Circuit correctly noted, and took into consideration, the
Government’s support of the individualized approach. In the
Government’s final brief on the Stoddard appeal, it was conceded that
the Government, at trial, argued that the jury should be charged with
utilizing the individualized approach and make the determination of the
quantity of drugs attributable to each individual defendant.118
Furthermore, in the Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v.
Haines, the court also acknowledged that the Government agreed that
the proper approach for determining the mandatory minimum should be
based on the jury’s finding as to the amount of controlled substance
attributable to or reasonably foreseeable to each individual defendant.119
Moreover, the Government again supported the individualized approach
in United States v. Young.120 In Young, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged
the Government’s assertion that the Government utilizes the
individualized approach when determining the appropriate charges for
individuals accused of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances and
other conspiracy charges.121
116. Stoddard, 892 F.3d at 1221-1222 (distinguishing United States v. Law, 528 F.3d 888, finding
that Law dealt with whether a violation of §846 encompasses all crimes in the conspiracy that were
reasonably foreseeable to the defendant.)
117. E.g. Stoddard, 892 F.3d at 1222; United States v. Young, 847 F.3d 328, 367 n.3 (6th Cir.
2017); United States v. Haines, 803 F.3d 713,738 (5th Cir. 2015).
118. Final Brief for Appellee at 65, United States v. Stoddard, 892 F.3d 1203 (D.C. Cir. 2018)
(No. 15-3060).
119. Haines, 803 F.3d at 738.
120. Young, 847 F.3d at 367 n.3.
121. Id.
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As is clear from these opinions, the Government, along with
defendants, have taken the stance that an individualized approach should
be utilized when determining the mandatory minimum for conspiracy to
distribute a controlled substance. Because both parties find the
individualized approach to be appropriate in determining the mandatory
minimum sentences, the circuit courts should heed this guidance and
support, and adopt the individualized approach. When both parties agree
to a sentence or sentencing scheme, it is often apparent that these parties
arrive at the conclusion due to the belief that it is the best policy
decision and in the best interest of both parties. When the circuit courts
continue to utilize the conspiracy-based approach, these courts are
undermining the Government’s reasoned decision of the how cases of
this type should be handled. These courts should align themselves with
the Government’s approach that the mandatory minimum for conspiracy
to distribute a controlled substance should be determined by the amount
attributable to or reasonably foreseeable to the individual defendant.
A second policy reason supporting the shift toward utilizing the
individualized approach is the large number of individuals in federal
prison for lengthy drug sentences.122 In October 2017, the United States
Sentencing Commission released a report based on their 2016 findings
regarding the impact of mandatory minimum sentences on individuals
charged and sentenced with federal drug offenses.123 While it does
acknowledge that “[t]he most commonly prosecuted drug offenses that
carry mandatory minimum penalties are 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 960,” this
report also discusses every drug offense that carries a mandatory
minimum penalty.124
The data collected by the U.S. Sentencing Commission demonstrates
that in 2016, convictions under the conspiracy statute, 21 U.S.C. § 846,
were one of the “most frequently used statutes carrying a mandatory
minimum penalty.”125 The report found that 21 U.S.C. § 846 accounted
for almost 6,000, or approximately 25%, of federal drug offenders
serving a mandatory minimum sentence for a controlled substance
offense.126 Additionally, most offenders, almost 50%, who are convicted
of a drug offense that carries a mandatory minimum penalty are
Category I offenders127—meaning that these offenders have 0 to 1
criminal history points.128 Therefore, these offenders are individuals
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

See generally, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2017 Overview, supra note 5.
Id. at 2.
Id.at 10.
Id. at 15.
Id. at Table 1.
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2017 Overview, supra note 5, Table 3.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL Ch. 5, pt. A, sentencing table (U.S. SENTENCING
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who have had very few, if any, prior convictions for other offenses.
Additionally, when reviewing the length of the mandatory minimum
sentences for drug offenders, the Commission found that “offenders who
remained subject to a drug mandatory minimum penalty at sentencing”
had an average sentence length of 126 months.”129
One main distinction between individuals convicted of controlled
substance offenses are their roles and functions in a “drug distribution
chain.”130 The United States Sentencing Commission has created
twenty-one categories for each function in the distribution chain based
on the conduct of the individual.131 The “ten most common functions”132
performed by individuals in a distribution chain include functions such
as importer/high level supplier, organizer, manager, street-level dealer,
mule, and employee.133 The Sentencing Commission has defined a
street-level dealer as an individual who “[d]istributes retail quantities
directly to the user; sells less than 1 ounce (28 grams) quantities to any
user(s).”134 While these street-level dealers do not deal large quantities
of controlled substances to users, in 2016, these individuals comprised
just over 16% of mandatory minimum drug offenders, second only to
courier’s at 18.6%.135 However, these street-level dealers who were
convicted and subject to mandatory minimum sentences received an
average sentence of only 97 months, compared to the 186 month and the
156 month sentences of individuals who were organizers/leaders or who
were managers/supervisors, respectively.136
Based on this data provided by the United States Sentencing
Commission, it is obvious that there is a great need to reduce the
sentences for low-level drug offenders. Since convictions under § 846,
the conspiracy statute, make up almost a quarter of controlled substance
convictions carrying a mandatory minimum penalty, it is clear that the
manner which the mandatory minimum is determined for that offense
can have an impact on the sentences of a large number of individuals
charged with federal drug crimes. Further, many individuals who are
charged with drug crimes are low level members of drug conspiracies
COMM’N 2018) (Shows that as an individual obtains more criminal history points on their record, the
Criminal History Category of the Sentencing Table likewise increases).
129. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2017 Overview, supra note 5, at 37.
130. Id. at 43.
131. Id. (however, the “report only presents data on the ten most common functions.”).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 44.
134. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2017 Overview, supra note 5, at 44.
135. Id. at 45 (A courier is defined as an individual who “[t]ransports or carries drugs with the
assistance of a vehicle or other equipment.” Id. at 44).
136. Id. at fig. 33.
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and organizations, such as street-level dealers or employees. However,
these street-level dealers, who are distributing comparatively small
quantities of controlled substances, still receive an average mandatory
minimum sentence for a drug offense of just over eight years. This
average mandatory minimum for street level dealers is only about five to
seven years lower than the average mandatory minimum sentence for an
organizer of a conspiracy.
These high average mandatory minimum sentences for individuals
distributing small quantities of drugs show a need for courts to adopt
sentencing policies that will provide lower mandatory minimums for
low-level dealers. By adopting the individualized approach over the
conspiracy-based approach, individuals will only be liable for the
amount they actually possessed or sold, or the amount that was
reasonably foreseeable or attributable to them, thus potentially making
their mandatory minimum penalty lower than if they were sentenced
based on the amount of drugs attributable to the entire conspiracy.
Following the individual based approach would allow courts to keep
individuals who served low-level functions from serving long and unjust
prison sentences.
C. Multiple circuits, such as the Sixth Circuit and Tenth Circuit, should
follow the guidance of Stoddard and change their standard to the
individualized approach.
While many circuits have adopted the individualized approach in
determining drug quantity for conspiracy to distribute,137 multiple
circuits are still adhering to precedent that embraces the conspiracywide approach.138 One circuit that has recently upheld the conspiracybased approach is the Sixth Circuit, in in United States v. Gibson and
United States v. Young. While the Sixth Circuit may have upheld the
conspiracy-based approach, there are multiple indicators showing that,
in the future, the Sixth Circuit may come to embrace the individualized
approach.
First, in the Sixth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Gibson, the
court, upon hearing the case en banc, issued a split decision on whether
the defendant’s conspiracy based mandatory minimum sentence was
proper and should be upheld.139 The divided court indicates that there is

137. E.g., United States v. Pizarro, 772 F.3d 284 (1st Cir. 2014); Untied United States v. Rangel,
781 F.3d 736 (4th Cir. 2015); United States v. Haines, 803 F.3d 713 (5th Cir. 2015); United States v.
Banuelos, 322 F.3d 700 (9th Cir. 2003).
138. E.g. United States v. Phillips, 349 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 2003), vacated on other grounds,
Barbour v. United States, 543 U.S. 1102 (2005); United States v. Knight, 342 F.3d 697 (7th Cir. 2003).
139. United States v. Gibson, 874 F.3d 544, 544 (6th Cir. 2017).
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a possibility the court may shift away from the conspiracy-based
approach and to the individualized approach in the future. This shift
toward considering the utilization of the individualized approach has the
possibility of occurring on similar future cases because mere months
before Gibson was decided, the Sixth Circuit refused to reconcile their
conflicting opinions on this issue in their decision in United States v.
Young. Although the Young court refused to resolve this issue in that
particular case, they found that when using either approach, all of the
controlled substances in that specific conspiracy were reasonably
foreseeable to the individual defendants.140 While the court refused to
reconcile the conflicting opinions on the quantity determination, this
shows that the court might have wanted to hold open the possibility of
taking a future, on-point case on this issue to utilize the individualized
approach.
While the Sixth Circuit has not directly overruled or affirmed the use
of the conspiracy-based approach in recent cases, the pattern jury
instructions for the Sixth Circuit show a support of the individualized
approach.141 The pattern jury instructions are drafted by a committee
that is comprised of Untied States Attorneys, Federal Public Defenders,
defense attorneys, District Court judges, and professors (the
“Committee”).142 These pattern jury instructions are created by the
Committee to provide guidance to the courts when instructing juries
during trials.143 These instructions are only officially approved by ruling
of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals through “a case-by-case review,”
as the instructions “should be tailored to fit the facts of each individual
case.”144
The pattern jury instruction for determining the amount of controlled
substance states that the jury must “determine the quantity of the
controlled substance involved in the conspiracy that was attributable to
him as the result of his own conduct and the conduct of other coconspirators that was reasonably foreseeable to him.”145 This instruction
clearly directs the jury to utilize the individualized approach in
determining the drug quantity for which the defendant is responsible for
in a drug conspiracy case. The aforementioned language is repeated in
the subsequent subsections of the instruction for determining quantity of
140. United States v. Young, 847 F.3d 328, 367 (6th Cir. 2017).
141. SIXTH CIRCUIT COMMITTEE ON PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Pattern Criminal
Jury
Instructions,
ch.
14.07B
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/sites/ca6/files/documents/pattern_jury/pdf/crmpattjur_full_0.pdf (updated
Jan. 1, 2019).
142. Id. at Sixth Circuit Pattern Criminal Jury Instruction Committee 2019.
143. Id. at intro.
144. Id. at intro.
145. Id. at Ch. 14.07B(1).

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2019

19

University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 87, Iss. 4 [2019], Art. 7

1164

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 87

a controlled substance. The subsequent two sections, 14.07(B)(2) and
(3), of the instruction repeat the phrase the “amount of [name of
controlled substance] was attributable to the defendant as the result of
his own conduct and the conduct of other co-conspirators that was
reasonably foreseeable to him.”146
In its commentary to this jury instruction, the Committee addressed
the inconsistencies in the Sixth Circuit’s determination of the mandatory
minimum for conspiracy to distribute drugs and other drug conspiracy
offenses.147 The Committee found that the determination of the
mandatory minimum should be bound by the older precedent of United
States v. Swiney,148 rather than the recent decisions of cases, such as
Gibson and Young.149 In United States v. Swiney, the Sixth Circuit held
that the mandatory minimum sentence for an individual under 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841 and 846 should be determined based on the reasonably
foreseeable analysis as set forth in U.S.S.G. §1B1.3(a)(1)(B).150 The
Swiney court reasoned that the “Sentencing Guidelines have modified
the Pinkerton theory” of conspirator liability thus making that case law
consistent with the goal of giving sentences based on the conduct done
by the individual defendant.151 Based on the precedent of the Swiney
decision, the Committee amended the pattern jury instruction to “delete
the phrase ‘involved in the conspiracy as a whole’ throughout the
text.”152 Further, the Committee went on to create special verdict forms
which also omitted language regarding the conspiracy-wide approach,
and replaced that language with a charge to the jury to utilize the
individualized approach and determine the quantity of the drugs
attributable to or reasonably foreseeable to the defendant.153
By acknowledging what the Committee believes to be the proper
precedent for drug conspiracy sentencing and by changing the language
of the pattern jury instructions, the Committee is asserting to the Sixth
Circuit that the court should clearly adopt the individualized approach.
The amendments to this section of the jury instructions demonstrates a

146. SIXTH CIRCUIT COMMITTEE ON PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 142,
ch. 14.07B(2); Id. at ch. 14.07(B)(3) (emphasis added).
147. SIXTH CIRCUIT COMMITTEE ON PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 142, at
ch. 14.07B, committee cmt. ¶ 2.
148. United States v. Swinney, 203 F.3d 397 (6th Cir. 2000).
149. SIXTH CIRCUIT COMMITTEE ON PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 142, at
ch. 14.07B, committee cmt. ¶ 2.
150. Id. at 405-406.
151. Id. at 404.
152. SIXTH CIRCUIT COMMITTEE ON PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 142,
ch. 14.07B, committee cmt. ¶ 2.
153. Id.; See. e.g. SIXTH CIRCUIT COMMITTEE ON PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra
note 142, Special Verdict Form §846, Form 14.07B-1.
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clear desire by the legal community to turn away from the conspiracybased approach to the individualized approach. While these pattern jury
instructions are not binding and are used only as a guide for the district
courts, these amendments demonstrate yet another indicator that there
may be a change to the Sixth Circuit’s jurisprudence on this issue.
IV. CONCLUSION
In light of the Stoddard decision and weighty policy objectives, it is
clear that all circuit courts use the amount of controlled substance
attributable to or reasonably foreseeable to a defendant as the standard
when determining the mandatory minimum sentence for a conspiracy to
distribute drugs charge. The decision in Stoddard provides a clear and
correct analysis of the precedent. Further, the United States Sentencing
Committee research demonstrates that mandatory minimum sentences
are lengthy for low-level offenders in drug conspiracies and that
conspiracy charges account for almost a quarter of drug offenses with
mandatory minimum sentences. Therefore, to combat high prison
populations, to provide just sentences for the crimes an individual
actually committed, and to align with Government charging decisions in
conspiracy to distribute cases, circuit courts should adopt the
individualized approach for determining the mandatory minimum for
conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance.
Additionally, the Sixth Circuit, and other circuits questioning the
proper approach to determining the mandatory minimum sentence,
should take note of the shifting opinions of the legal community and
apply the individualized approach in their opinions. Based on the clear
support of the legal community and sound legal rationale for utilizing
the individualized approach, the Sixth Circuit should follow the
Stoddard court by reassessing a case on this issue and finding that the
mandatory minimum for conspiracy to distribute drugs should be
determined based on the amount of drugs attributable to or reasonably
foreseeable to the individual defendant.
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